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I. INTRODUCTION
Every day, children in classrooms across the country are told they
must stand and recite the pledge of allegiance in unwitting violation of
the First Amendment.1 Meanwhile, in cafeterias from Kansas to
California, children forego their own quiet prayers, believing even
private prayer in school to be prohibited.2 Police officers stop citizens
and ask for their consent to searches and interrogations.3 Many say yes
because they do not believe they can say no.4 People jaywalk, adversely
possess, claim exemptions, and refuse to pay their taxes because they
dubiously believe they can legally do so.5 Merchants write and people
sign contracts without the remotest idea whether the terms are
enforceable or whether the oral promises they exchange have changed
it.6 Even in run-of-the-mill litigation, experienced commercial litigators
and criminal lawyers routinely argue over discovery rights, enlargements
of time, and the meaning of words like “jurisdiction,” “unfairness,” and
the “interests of justice.” They do not always do this because they are
villainous law abusers. Often, they do it because they sincerely disagree
about what the law requires.
Yet, lawyers, laymen, law professors, and legal scholars often insist
that “there is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout
the system.”7 These claims are frequent and seldom carefully examined.
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. See John M. Swomley, Myths About Voluntary School Prayer, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 294,
297 (1996).
3. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
4. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 233
(1997) (“The most baffling aspect of the Supreme Court’s conception of voluntary consent is that it
virtually ignores the well-documented observation that most people mechanically obey legitimate
authority.”); see also People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he greatest
legal fiction of the late 20th Century . . . .”).
5. Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2229, 2232 (2013) (explaining
the concept of “shallow signals” in which “the law’s design may contribute to . . . misperception,
and in which . . . misguided imitation [of conduct that is legal for A] results in illegal conduct [by
B].”).
6. Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral
Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 57 (2013) (“The . . .
Problem exists on the border between contract and tort law, creating confusion for courts and
leading to inconsistent rulings.”).
7. Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1227
(2009). (“[T]here is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout the system.”); id. at
1228 (“To be sure, we must concede the obvious: massive agreement about the law—not
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Nevertheless, when it is insisted that there is widespread agreement
about the law, it is often unclear what that means. Is it agreement about
what is illegal? As in, what laws there are and what they prohibit or
allow? Is it agreement about how to find out if something is illegal? As
in, what sources you might look to, or how you might reason about those
sources? Is it a prediction about what will happen in a case, what
conduct will be scrutinized, or what cases will be brought?
If the question was put to you, and I claimed that there was massive
and pervasive agreement about the law, what would you think I meant
by that? How would you understand whether it was a true statement? If
it was a true statement, what would it mean for theories of law and
adjudication? This last question is especially interesting, because in the
eyes of many Legal Positivists, the existence of massive agreement
strikes a decisive blow in favor of that theory.8
This Article grapples with the question of what it means to agree
about what the law is. First, it shows that the question of what it means
to “agree about the law” invites us to consider many different kinds of
agreement and disagreement we might have about what the law is.
Second, it shows that without selecting one of these kinds of agreement,
we cannot speak intelligibly about whether we agree or disagree. Third,
it explains that this failure to choose is a source of much confusion and
apparent disagreement between competing philosophers and
philosophies of law. Fourth, it argues that the presence or absence of at
least certain kinds of agreement cannot tell us whether we should prefer
Legal Positivism or other theories of law. Finally, it concludes that the
pervasive reliance among Positivists on a generalized notion that there
exists “massive agreement” about the law should be regarded
disagreement—is the norm in modern legal systems.”); id. at 1231 (“At the base of the pyramid,
ordinary language and ordinary meaning hold sway, which, together with the convergence of
officials on criteria of legal validity, render most cases clear and produce massive agreement in
legal judgments.”); see also Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism (Again)?, 11 (U. Chi. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 442, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323013 (“[T]here exists massive agreement about what the law is in the
vast, vast majority of legal questions that arise in ordinary life. If there were not massive agreement
on the law, then every modern legal system would collapse under the weight of the disputes that
resulted.”); John Oberdiek, Specifying Constitutional Rights, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 246 (2010)
(reviewing GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF
RIGHTS (2009)) (“As a general matter, no one should deny that there is widespread agreement about
the law. . . .”); Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801, 839 (2012)
(“[There is] widespread agreement about law’s constraints . . . .”); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia,
Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1029 (1994) (“[O]ur legal
system presently contains enough clear rules to allow us to govern our day-to-day behavior. . . .”).
8. See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1227; Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 413 (1985).
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skeptically.
II. WHY TALK ABOUT LEGAL AGREEMENT?
Why should we be concerned with the concept of legal agreement
at all? To answer that question, it might be best to take a step back
before stepping forward. Legal philosophers have long been concerned
with variants of the question, “What is law?”9 They have asked, “What
is law?” and meant, what makes law uniquely “law” and not something
else—a game, a policy, or a plan?10 They have also asked, “What is
law?” and meant, must there be law, and must it be one way and not
another?11 They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant, what role
does or should law play in society?12 They have also asked, “What is
law?” and meant, what is necessary or sufficient for something to be the
law or against it?13 They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant,
how do we define or identify that category of things we call laws?14
They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant, what does or should
the law entitle people to do, or to have?15 They have also asked, “What
is law?” and meant, what will a court do when confronted with a case?16
And this is a non-exhaustive list.
The question, “What is law?” is a difficult one because it is difficult
to know what exactly is being asked.17 But there is a different question
that will help us answer a number of these other questions. That different
question is whether, for something to be “the law,” officials must agree
with each other that it is the law, or whether there need not be such
agreement. Answering this question can tell us a great deal about these
other questions. It can help us understand what distinguishes law from
other social practices. It can help us know what purposes law does or
should serve in society. It can help us, in the actual practice of law, to
identify those arguments that are legal and those arguments that are nonlegal. The fact of widespread agreement—and, in particular, widespread
agreement of a particular kind—would be enormously significant if we
understood it well.
9. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 223-24 (2001)
(simultaneously lamenting and extolling this litany of “What is law?” variants and its confusions).
10. Id. at 226-27.
11. Id. at 224.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 223.
14. Id. at 222.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id.
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977) (making this point).
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According to the leading theory of law, Legal Positivism, for a law
to be “law,” there must be agreement among officials about what it is
and what it dictates.18 On this view, a judge would be right on the law to
hold a particular individual accountable for murder in a particular case
only if that judge acted pursuant to a convention among legal officials
dictating that the judge do so.19 This convention, or “social rule,” called
the rule of recognition sets the criteria by which a judge decides what the
law is and how to apply it.20 Where the rule of recognition is unclear, the
law is unclear, and the judge must exercise discretion in deciding the
case.21 There is no fixed or determinate law to apply in such cases.22
Put another way, Legal Positivism argues that the very means of
discovering whether something is against the law is to see if, in the mine
run of cases, when the question is put before different judges, those
judges apply the same criteria for determining legal validity and reach

18. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 290 (2011) (“The idea that the criteria of legality
are determined by consensus is not just one aspect of legal practice among many; on current
accounts of legal positivism, it is the fundamental ground rule of law. What ultimately makes it the
case that some rule is a binding legal rule is that it is validated by some standard accepted by
officials of the group.”); Steven J. Burton, Law As Practical Reason, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 747, 766
(1989) (“The rule of recognition, and all of the laws identified by it, rest on a social convention.”);
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
591 (1993) (“The scope of legal reasons will be set by ‘a rule of recognition’ or binding sources and
conventions, whereas the scope of legitimating reasons for acting will be set by the relevant political
theory of the state.”).
19. This is perhaps the Maginot line between the theory of law expounded by Ronald
Dworkin, who contends that there can be law without convergent social practices, see, e.g.,
DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 36, and those who reject this view, see, e.g. Leiter, Explaining
Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1222. One way of framing the difference between
believing judges do or don’t seek to apply—but rather “make”—law turns on whether one believes
umpires always merely call balls and strikes or sometimes make them. See Charles Yablon, On the
Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227, 234 (1994) (“Consider the
legendary discussion among three umpires as to the proper way to judge whether pitches are balls or
strikes. Says the first, ‘I call them as I see them.’ The second counters, ‘I call them as they are.’ The
third responds, ‘they ain’t nothing until I call them.’”); see also DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 32-34,
39 (“Positivists treat law like baseball revised this way [allowing the umpires to occasionally
redefine ‘balls’ and ‘strikes’]”).
20. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 102 & n.119 (2005) (“The rule of recognition specifies binding criteria for
legal officials to use in deciding whether a given norm is a rule that is part of a legal system.”).
21. H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 653 (2013) (recently rediscovered,
published posthumously) (setting forth “cases where everyone would agree that we have the
phenomenon of discretion”).
22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 984 (1995)
(“When the law confronts an unanticipated situation raising questions about its underlying goals, the
problem of open texture will arise, and people interpreting the law will have discretion, in a sense,
to make law on their own.”).
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the same results.23 There might be problems of talent, capacity, clarity,
knowledge, and so forth in the doing, but the application of law—true
law—is the solving of a formula, not the painting of a portrait.24 There is
agreement on what the symbols and operators mean and how they fit
together. A good judge who confronts an easy case could fit the symbols
and operators together as a matter of expertise in the performance of his
duties and nothing else.25
This leads to a critical lemma of Legal Positivism, which is that
there is no necessary connection between law and morality.26 While
Legal Positivists are willing to say that moral considerations can be
operators in the legal formula, none will say that they must be. This has
become so synonymous with Legal Positivism that some argue the
separation of law and morals is Legal Positivism’s constitutive feature27
(though it is fairer to say that dependence on a particular kind of
conventionality is actually its defining feature).28
23. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1222 (“[T]he only dispute
about the criteria of legal validity that is possible, on Hart’s view, is an empirical or ‘head count’
dispute: namely, a dispute about what judges are doing, and how many of them are doing it, since it
is the actual practice of officials and their attitudes towards that practice that fixes the criteria of
legal validity according to the Positivist.”).
24. Cf. Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 648-49, 666 (1932)
(caricaturing formalism as reducing law to “Rules Times Facts = Decision”).
25. As a Positivist would be the first to tell you, the very notion that we can speak intelligibly
about one judge or lawyer being better at the law, and one being worse, confirms this facet of Legal
Positivism. See Joseph Raz, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37, 48-50 (2d ed. 1979). But this argument is not particularly
strong for the same reasons that the argument from agreement is not particularly strong. See infra
Part III. To give something of a preview: history has managed to rank painters and statesmen, but
few would say they are like mathematicians.
26. Some would take issue with this formulation of Legal Positivism’s most famous lemma.
John Gardner rejects its existence. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 201. Jules Coleman embraces it.
See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO
LEGAL THEORY 152 (2001); id. at 104 n.4 (“As I have used the term, the separability thesis is the
claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. That claim does express a
tenet of Positivism. . . .”). Positivists appear to be confused about their position on the question. See
Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 103738 (2008).
27. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 151 (“It is common to characterize Legal
Positivism in terms of two basic tenets: the social fact thesis and the separability thesis. Of the two,
the separability thesis is more familiar, more closely associated with Positivism, and more
contested—all of which strikes me as somewhat mystifying”); HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID
HOLDCROFT, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 3 (1991) (“the quintessence of Legal
Positivism”).
28. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 107-08 (“If what unites exclusive and inclusive
Legal Positivism is a commitment to the conventionality of the criteria of legality, what
distinguishes them is a difference over what can count as a criterion of legality.”); Gardner, supra
note 9; Green, supra note 26, at 1057 (“Law is a matter of social rules . . . the rule of rules . . . .”).
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There are other theories of law, some of which disagree
fundamentally with Legal Positivism’s major premise that legal validity
is determined by a particular kind of conventionality among legal
officials. For instance, Natural Law theories have often held that law is
something outside of us—an omnipresence, like numbers perhaps, that
seems simply to exist.29 Other theorists have argued that law has no
conventionality unique to it,30 or it need not, does not, or cannot depend
on conventionality.31 Those who reject conventionality entirely take the
view that law is whatever the judge says it is: the interpreter of the law is
its author.32 This view is often associated with Legal Realism,33 and later
critical legal studies,34 and is sometimes called the argument from
indeterminacy35 or rule skepticism.36 Every legal ruling is simply the
29. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (2d ed. 1980);
MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 6 (1977).
30. This was seemingly the position of Lon Fuller and, at various times, Ronald Dworkin.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 140-41 (rev. ed. 1964); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE
IN ROBES 188-89 (2006); Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 621, 627 (1987).
31. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 166 (“Dworkin rejects conventionalism of all kinds
and at every turn.”); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 138 (1986) (“[N]othing need be settled as a
matter of convention in order for a legal system not only to exist but flourish.”).
32. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8 (1958) (quoting Bishop Hoadley’s
sermon before George the First in 1717: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret written or
spoken laws; it is he who is truly the lawgiver to all intents and purposes and not the person who
wrote or spoke them.”).
33. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism As Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917-18 (2005) (“According to this theory, statutes and the like may be law, but they
are too indeterminate to be significant influences on, or predictors of judges’ decisions. Because the
law is indeterminate, judges actually decide cases on the basis of non-legal considerations.”); see
also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing Legal Realism as the
view “that talk of rules is a myth, cloaking the truth that law consists simply of the decisions of
courts and the prediction of them . . . .”); DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3 (characterizing Legal
Realism as the view that “judges actually decide cases according to their own political or moral
tastes, and then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization.”); Jon O. Newman, Between
Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L.. REV.
200, 203 (1984) (painting Legal Realism as the view that “the judge simply selects the result that
best comports with personal values and then enlists, sometimes brutally, whatever doctrines
arguably support the result.”).
34. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 205, 227-35 (1986); Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies:
Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 241-42 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 351, 351-54 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283-84 (1989); Brian
Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 487 (1995).
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 479-80 (1987) (critiquing it); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of
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judge’s preferred decision, and every explanation of the ruling merely a
post-hoc rationalization.37
Because neither Natural Law theory nor nonconventionality
theories like Legal Realism or Dworkinism depend for their validity on
agreement about what the law is, Legal Positivists have been using the
argument from “massive agreement” as an argument in favor of Legal
Positivism for decades. The argument is straightforward once you know
the premises underlying these varying theories. Legal Positivism stems
from the belief that a kind of massive agreement about law already exists
and builds a theory around it.38 Legal Positivism thus both predicts
massive agreement and depends for its vitality upon it. And we see, so
say the Positivists, massive agreement. On the other hand, other theories
of law, such as Natural Law, Legal Realism, and Dworkinism, have no
necessary connection with massive agreement. Not depending for their
truth on massive agreement, they nonetheless observe massive
agreement. This is thought to be a profound failure of consilience—the
principle that all things being equal, we prefer theories that explain more
things.39 Natural Law theories and nonconventionality theories give no
explanation of a feature—massive agreement—that Legal Positivists
Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 683, 688 (1985) (describing the content
of the theory).
37. See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206
(1984) (“Like traditional jurists, the Critical scholars are obsessed with the judicial function and its
alleged central importance for an understanding of law in society. Yet, while they share this
infatuation, they adopt a radically different view of the judicial process: All the Critical scholars
unite in denying the rational determinacy of legal reasoning. Their basic credo is that no distinctive
mode of legal reasoning exists to be contrasted with political dialogue. Law is simply politics
dressed in different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist independently of
ideological struggles in society. Legal doctrine not only does not, but also cannot, generate
determinant results in concrete cases. Law is not so much a rational enterprise as a vast exercise in
rationalization. Legal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost infinite spectrum of possible
outcomes. Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that any such outcome has been derived
from the dominant legal conceptions. Legal doctrine is nothing more than a sophisticated
vocabulary and repertoire of manipulative techniques for categorizing, describing, organizing, and
comparing; it is not a methodology for reaching substantive outcomes. As psychiatrists create ‘a
monologue of reason about madness,’ so, the CLSers claim, do lawyers establish a fake rationalistic
discourse out of the chaos of political and social life.”).
38. See sources cited supra, notes 18-20.
39. See Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76,
79 (1978) (“Consilience is intended to serve as a measure of how much a theory explains, so that we
can use it to tell when one theory explains more of the evidence than another theory. Roughly, a
theory is said to be consilient if it explains at least two classes of facts. Then one theory is more
consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts than the other does. Intuitively, we show
one theory to be more consilient than another by pointing to a class or classes of facts which it
explains but which the other theory does not.”).
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consider endemic to every functioning legal system.
Hence, Legal Positivists argue that massive agreement about what
the law is powerfully favors Legal Positivism. As the remainder of this
Article endeavors to show, however, when we get down to brass-tacks, it
is unclear what kind of agreement Legal Positivists are referring to when
they refer to massive agreement, and many of the kinds of agreement
they could be referring to—were we to use them—would mean there is
massive disagreement about the law, cutting strongly against Legal
Positivism. Moreover, other theories of law are capable of explaining
massive agreement without undermining their core claims. As such, the
claim of massive agreement seems at best irrelevant and at worst
actively harmful to the Positivist program. Thus, it is quite puzzling that
massive agreement is so frequently deployed as an argument for
Positivism.
III. WHAT IS LEGAL AGREEMENT?
Legal agreement could mean many things. It could mean (A)
agreement about the existence of laws; (B) agreement about the meaning
of legal sources; (C) agreement about how to reason about legal sources;
(D) agreement about the outcomes of cases; or (E) agreement about legal
propositions. It is neither naïve nor uncharitable to be confused about
which of the aforementioned senses is meant when the existence of
massive legal agreement is asserted.
Perfect precision is not necessary to every discussion, and it is a
great virtue that not everything that is said requires further
clarification.40 But the imprecision in the meaning of “agreement,” as it
is frequently employed in this context is an important imprecision. This
is especially so because the argument from massive agreement plays a
pivotal role in bolstering important arguments about the legitimacy of
the legal system and the descriptive accuracy of Legal Positivism. In
keeping the notion of legal agreement vague, individuals offering the
argument from massive agreement invite us each to pick out what we
think it means, without realizing we could all think it means something
different.

40. 1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 13-14 (W. Ross trans. 1940) (“Our discussion will
be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be
sought for alike in all discussions . . . .”).
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Setting The Stage: A Hypothetical Statute

The best way of presenting the different possible ways of
understanding legal agreement is by way of example. Consider a
hypothetical statute: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.” On the one hand, this may seem like a
bad statute to consider because it carries what some might consider
extralegal constitutional dimensions. It appears, for example, awfully
similar to the Fifth Amendment (on account of its identity with it).41
On the other hand, this statute could not be more banal—every
jurisdiction, down to the smallest small town, is free to enact it.42 It
could have been snatched out of a police manual or a court’s local rules.
As far as I know, every state has something similar.43 One might object
that this rule of police procedure seems to appear only in constitutions,
and therefore, is more aspirational than real.44 But one glance at the
words shows it is not vague or indefinite. It does not invoke abstract
notions like due process, equal protection, or cruelty and unusualness.
Rather, it says, simply, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. Its presence in constitutions seems
more to measure its importance than its intended operation—one would
expect that if it were not woven in constitutional fiber, it would be
written precisely the same way in local codes and ordinances of various
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself”).
42. See BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMMITTEE, RESOLUTIONS AND ORDINANCES CRITICAL
OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER LAWS AND POLICIES THAT DIMINISH CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2008) (listing over 400 county and local governments enacting resolutions affirming the Bill of
Rights).
43. This was the case at least as of 1965. Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79
HARV. L. REV. 21, 30 (1965) (“In 1791 the privilege against self-incrimination found a place in the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution; by 1965 the constitution of every state except
Iowa and New Jersey has explicitly guaranteed to the accused immunity from self-incrimination in
criminal proceedings. Iowa and New Jersey have long guaranteed the same immunity by
legislation.”); see also, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 10; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XVI; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; KY.
CONST. § 11; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8.
44. Laurence Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 87-93 nn.57-58 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997) (contending that
many provisions of the Bill of Rights—”equal protection” “privileges and immunities” “rights . . .
retained by the people”—are aspirational in nature, setting forth broad principles to be interpreted in
succeeding generations, while others serve as an “unambiguous blueprint for running a
government”).
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jurisdictions. And so it is.45 Like all of the most beautiful and basic laws,
it is simple and declarative. It states what is prohibited. In that way, it is
similar in kind and quality to the laws against murder and mayhem, and
it can therefore serve as an excellent vehicle for explaining the ways we
might agree or disagree about what it means.
Before diving into the various modes of agreement we might have,
it would be useful to have in mind the following hypotheticals—easy,
medium, and hard—so we might have a common grammar with which
to describe the different senses of agreement:
1) The Case of a Clear Violation but a Procedural Defect in Its
Assertion. Three black men in Mississippi are tried for the murder of a
46
47
white planter. The county sheriff takes their statements. He testifies
that the “confessions took place in jail and were free and voluntary,”
but concedes that while one man was confessing, “another one came in
who had been so badly whipped and beaten that he was unable to sit
48
down.” Other evidence showed “without any material conflict,” that
“all the confessions made to the sheriff and other witnesses were
49
forced by brutal whippings and beatings.” But the Defendants fail to
raise their objections to the admission of their statements in accordance
50
with state procedural rules, thus, forfeiting them.
2) The Case of a Long Interrogation, Contestably Voluntary
Confession. Officers remove a man from his home in the early evening
51
hours on a Saturday. They take him to an office on the fifth floor of
the county jail, “equipped with all sorts of crime and detective devices,
such as a fingerprint outfit, cameras, high-powered lights, and such
52
other devices as might be found in a homicide investigating office.”
They begin to quiz him continuously, questioning him in relays—they
53
themselves becoming so tired they cannot continue. At hour twenty54
eight, about 11 p.m. Sunday night, he confesses. Or, perhaps, he
45. Louisiana’s Criminal Code looks similar, for instance, to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the free-and-voluntary confession rule. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:451 (West,
Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“Before what purports to be a confession can be introduced
in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the
influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.”).
46. Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 339 (Miss. 1935), rev’d, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
47. Id. at 339.
48. Id.at 343 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 341-42.
51. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149 (1944).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 151.
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55

doesn’t. According to officers, “he is ‘cool’, ‘calm’, ‘collected,’
56
‘normal’” at the time of his confession.
3) The Case of an Ambiguously Coercive Non-Interrogation. A twelve57
year-old boy is indicted for arson. Committed to jail in Philadelphia,
“several respectable citizens” come visit him in his cell,
58
“represent[ing] to him the enormity of the crime.” They tell him a
confession would mean “compassion,” probably, “a pardon,” but no
59
confession would leave him “without hope.” The inspectors show
60
him the dungeon, and explain its “gloom and horror.” Though the
boy “continue[s] to deny his guilt for some time,” at length he
61
confesses.
4) The Case of Harsh Interrogations of a Non-Citizen Detainee in an
Arguably Non-Criminal Setting. An Algerian native is captured in
Faisalabad, Pakistan in February 2002 and brought to the Naval Base
62
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He is subjected to intense interrogations,
interrupted sleep patterns, and repetitive rounds of “harsh” questioning
63
64
for two months. He later makes inculpatory statements.
5) The Case of an Interrogation Outside of Custody, Outside of a
Criminal Setting, Without a Miranda Warning. A man is stopped at the
U.S.-Mexico border and asked a question by a police officer before
65
He makes an incriminating
being read his Miranda rights.
66
statement.

These cases give a sense of the law’s open texture and the way that
a simple rule confronts an enormous range of not-so-simple facts.67 The
55. Id. at 150 (“As to what happened in the fifth-floor jail room during this thirty-six hour
secret examination the testimony follows the usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict.”).
56. Id. at 151 (“[H]is vision was unimpaired . . . his eyes not bloodshot . . . he showed no
outward signs of being tired or sleepy.”).
57. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 U.S. 116 (1792).
58. Id. at 116.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Shafiiq v. Obama, 951 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013).
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001).
66. See, e.g., id. at 1098 (“The case books are full of scenarios in which a person is detained
by law enforcement officers, is not free to go, but is not ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes. A traffic
stop is not custody. A Terry stop-and-frisk is not custody. A brief detention at the border by
immigration and customs officials of persons presenting themselves for admission to the United
States is not custody, even though such persons are not free to leave or to refuse to be searched.”);
id. at 1101.
67. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 421 (“Open texture is not vagueness, which is always
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mantra in law, and even in philosophy of law, often seems to be:
simplify, simplify. But it is occasionally useful to see that sometimes we
simplify too much—that the range of possible factual scenarios is nearly
infinite, and that just when we think we have identified the core or
archetypical case, we discover no such thing exists. With this
groundwork in mind, let us now consider the many ways in which we
might agree about what the law means.
B.

Existential Agreement

First, and most elementally, we might simply agree that a law
exists, and that it exists in a certain form with certain words. This is not
agreement on its semantic content, let alone its legal content. Rather, this
is agreement that the words that are in it are in it. For the purpose of our
example, this is agreement that our sample law exists, that it is located in
a particular authoritative source, and that it says “no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
In general, there may not even exist this minimal agreement as to
the vast majority of laws. The Constitution is both short and arguably
readable. The individual-rights provisions—those substantive provisions
that might directly affect the day-to-day interactions of people with, for
instance, the police—are even shorter and more readable. They are
located in the commendably succinct Bill of Rights. Yet survey after
survey and poll after poll show that average Americans have no idea
what is in the Bill of Rights except in the vaguest terms.68 Remarkably,
the most basic ground for agreement about the law—agreement about its
words—is literally absent from society.
This absence of agreement, moreover, is an absence of agreement
that rises all the way to the very top: to the words of society’s supreme
law. People have a sense that they are free to speak, free to publish, free
to worship. But they do not know the words nor the content of those
eliminable, but is rather the possibility of future vagueness, which is not eliminable. For example,
although there is no doubt now about what does and what does not count as a ‘goldfinch,’ an
encounter with a bird that was like a goldfinch in every respect save that it exploded before our eyes
would then cause us to be uncertain about whether the exploding creature was or was not a
goldfinch.”); see also NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 74 (1955) (describing
“grue” a heretofore unnecessary word for all those things which were green before time t and are
now blue).
68. See Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 640-42
(2012) (“Ignorance about basic aspects of the Constitution is also extensive. . . . Only twenty-eight
percent can name two or more of the five rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . According
to a 2002 survey, only thirty-one percent realize that Karl Marx’s famous dictum ‘from each
according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ is not in the Constitution.”)
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laws. They rarely wonder, for instance, why fraud is unlawful, question
the absence of tobacco ads on television, or, ask why the quarterback
cannot lead a prayer before the big game. Nobody seems to know if you
really get one phone call in jail.69 Frequently, even the legislators who
make the laws do not know what it is they are enacting.70 As one
textbook puts it, “Almost the only knowledge of the law possessed by
many people is that ignorance of it is no excuse.”71
Yet ignorance of the law is both broad and deep. Stepping back just
one level, from the most basic law to the corpus of federal law, it seems
almost inevitable that individuals are massively unaware of the “more
than 4,000 federal criminal statutes” in the United States “spread out
across the fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages of federal law.”72 When
“federal regulations that can be enforced in criminal prosecutions” are
added to the mix, “the number of potentially relevant federal laws may
exceed 300,000.”73 There are so many federal laws “that no one, not
even the Justice Department, knows the actual number of federal
criminal offenses.”74
69. It is a matter of state law, and it is a right of arrestees in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 12.25.150 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.5 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg.
Sess.); IOWA CODE § 804.20 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 33A (West, Westlaw
through the 2014 2d Annual Sess.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (McKinney, Westlaw through
L.2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-20 (West, Westlaw through Chap. 555 of the Jan. 2014
session); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-106 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.). One would
not be remiss in asking if it should not follow a fortiori from the constitutional right not to be
compelled to be a witness against oneself.
70. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 34 (1945) (“Now it is a fact often,
if not always, a considerable number of those who vote for a bill have at most a very superficial
knowledge of its contents.”).
71. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 451 (2d ed. 1983); see also Meir
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625, 645-46 (1984) (“If one were to take a poll and ask about the legal significance
of ignorance of law, most non-lawyers would answer, I believe, by citing the maxim that ‘ignorance
of the law is no excuse.’”).
72. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739 (2012).
73. Id. at 739-40.
74. Id. at 739-41 (“The federal criminal law also is not limited to crimes that mirror any
readily recognizable moral code. No criminal code that outlaws the unauthorized use of Smokey the
Bear’s image or the slogan ‘Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute’ can credibly claim to exclude trivial
conduct wholly unrelated to moral delinquency. Other equally nefarious crimes are the failure to
keep a pet on a leash that does not exceed six feet in length; digging or leveling the ground at a
campsite picnicking in a non-designated area; operating a ‘motorized toy, or an audio device, such
as a radio, television set, tape deck or musical instrument, in a manner . . . [[t]hat exceeds a noise
level of 60 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet’ (whatever that means); ‘[b]athing,
or washing food, clothing, dishes, or other property at public water outlets, fixtures or pools’ not
designated for that purpose; ‘[a]llowing horses or pack animals to proceed in excess of a slow walk
when passing in the immediate vicinity of persons on foot or bicycle’; operating a snowmobile that
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Moreover, even the saltiest litigators are often unaware of the scope
and breadth of the procedural doctrines that might be brought to bear in
run-of-the-mine lawsuits. Few lawyers realize the potentially enormous
consequences, for example, of a misunderstanding in an oral argument.75
Fewer still can name the doctrines that might be used to punish one:
judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, collateral estoppel,
“mend the hold,” “fraud on the court,” judicial and evidentiary
admission, forfeiture, and, waiver, to name a few. Sometimes “the courts
do not even clearly identify why an inconsistent [litigating] position
should be precluded; it seems rather to be a matter of it ‘just isn’t
right.’”76
Frequently, situations arise where existential agreement is
unobtainable because uncertainty over what law “there is” is too great.
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has been developing an array of
doctrines that deal precisely with this—prominently in the areas of
criminal law77 and official immunity from civil liability78—permitting
courts to deny redress for past constitutional violations when the claim
to relief rests on “new” law.79 But “new” law isn’t “new” law—it is,
rather, an “unpredict[ed]” application of the constitution’s existing
requirements.80
The legal system makes a number of concessions to the problem of
existential uncertainty. Judges’ evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a
very deferential standard by appellate courts.81 Decisions about whether
to issue preliminary injunctions or declaratory judgments are also

makes ‘excessive noise’; using roller skates, skateboards, roller skis, coasting vehicles, or similar
devices in non-designated areas; failing to turn in found property to the park superintendent ‘as soon
as practicable’; and using a surfboard on a beach designated for swimming.”).
75. See, e.g., Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1996); Veillon v.
Exploration Servs., Inc., 876 F.2d 1197, 1199 (5th Cir. 1989).
76. Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with a
Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable
Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, “Mend the Hold,” “Fraud on the Court” and
Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 591-92 (1998).
77. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-17 (1989) (holding that subject only to
narrow exceptions, a federal habeas court should dismiss claims based on “new” rules of
constitutional law without reaching the merits).
78. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (holding that officials sued
in constitutional tort actions generally are immune from damages liability unless their conduct
violated “clearly established” law).
79. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733-38 (1991).
80. See id. at 1758-77.
81. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 780-83 (1982).
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reviewed under this deferential standard.82 The decision to issue a
warrant is reviewed with “great deference.”83 Additionally, the
reasonable suspicions of police officers are given this same deference.84
Administrative agencies classically receive substantial deference in their
judgments about what the law means.85 Judges also show deference to
other judges through the practice of following precedent, a practice that
stems in no small measure from humility in the face of uncertainty about
what the law is. If recent academic writing on the relationship between
caseloads and appellate scrutiny is given its due, deference is often
directly traceable to how much time judges and their clerks have
available to devote to finding out what the law is.86
But building in an escape hatch for uncertainty about what law
exists is not agreement. Deference is not agreement. Deference is
agreement that what law “there is” is uncertain.87
All this is to say that the argument from massive agreement cannot
be referring to massive agreement about what the laws are. At the zeroth
step of inquiry into what the law is—”what laws are there?”—there
almost certainly exists very little agreement at all.
C.

Content Agreement

Existential agreement is merely one way of looking at agreement,
and almost certainly not the way that is meant when it is asserted that
“there is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout the
system.”88 After all, it cannot be, at least not without undermining the
claim to massive agreement right out of the gate. Another way we might
agree about what the law is, then, is that we might agree about what the
law means when a law (or the law) is put before us. There are two ways
of understanding this form of agreement, and this section will take up

82. See id. at 773-79.
83. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969)).
84. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 (1996) (holding that review of police
officer’s reasonableness must give due weight to “police experience and expertise”).
85. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1989) (“[T]he courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the
ambiguous terms of a statute that the agency administers.”).
86. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (2011) (presenting
empirical evidence suggesting a causal link between judicial burdens and the outcomes of appeals).
87. The law may be determinate and knowable at any moment, but it may be the case that
there is not enough time to determine it. But there is an important difference between uncertainty
and indeterminacy: it is the difference between what is unknown and what is unknowable.
88. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1227.
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both of them. They are agreement about semantic (or communicative)
content and agreement about legal content.
1. Semantic Content Agreement
The first form of content agreement we might be referring to when
we refer to massive agreement as a kind of content agreement is what
might be called semantic, communicative or linguistic agreement. That
means agreement about language as language—it includes more than
words, but also sentences, paragraphs, texts, and so on, but, it
understands their meaning as part of language conventions as opposed to
legal conventions.89
Quite often, in conversation, we exchange phrases between one
another and ask each other “what we really mean.” But sometimes we
are left to hopelessly attempt to puzzle out what someone meant without
the opportunity to ask him or her. That case is determined by semantic
agreement. Putting aside any opportunity to elaborate through
applications, criteria, tests, archetypes, examples, or hypotheticals,
semantic agreement turns on each of us having a shared understanding
of what is meant in English without the opportunity to ask anyone else
what they think is meant.90
A skeptic might say that when our concern is legal agreement, this
form of agreement would seem almost beside the point. Semantic
agreement is just the agreement that allows an English speaker to
distinguish between the meaning of the words “wife” and “hat.” It is the
type of agreement that makes this text intelligible to a native English
speaker at all. But even hardened Positivists agree there is no necessary
connection between semantic meaning and legal meaning, and most
would agree that semantic meaning cannot be all that there is to deciding
propositions of law.91
89. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 44, at 117 (“[T]extualism
insists on deference to one kind of intention—semantic intention”).
90. David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.76 (1992)
(“Effective communication constantly requires us to use words (like ‘table’ or ‘red’ or ‘addition’) in
novel situations in the same way other people would. We are confident in our abilities to do so, even
though we typically lack the benefit of their views about correct usage until after we have spoken.”);
id. at 20 (“When we say that someone has applied a concept correctly (like the operation called
‘addition’ or the adjective ‘red’), we mean that he or she acted the way we would. Fluency in a
language means that a subject is able to make such judgments correctly, intuitively and without
reflection, and without first consulting other community members.”); see Schauer, supra note 8, at
414-20.
91. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between these two forms of meaning, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
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A debate about semantic meaning’s special importance to law
formed the core of one of the most famous jurisprudential debates in
history: the Hart-Fuller debate.92 It then became the fulcrum over which
debates about legal determinacy and indeterminacy flourished for
another half-century.93 As such, the idea that agreement on what the law
is might be reducible to—or at the very least intimately bound up with—
semantic agreement remains a plausible candidate for what is meant
when legal agreement is discussed.
The Hart-Fuller debate began with Hart’s insistence—in the face of
criticisms by Legal Realists that all legal rules are hopelessly
indeterminate94—that there exist a multitude of easy cases because there
is widespread agreement about ordinary semantic or language
meaning.95 Fuller responded by insisting that it takes little imagination to
generate an almost limitless number of cases that seem like they should
be easy from a language-view, but are in fact quite hard from a legalcontent view.96 Both were right, since neither was disputing the other’s
core claim. There are many easy cases arising from shared semanticcontent meanings, and there are many semantically easy-looking cases
that are in fact hard because of other non-semantic considerations.97
Given significant revisions in the claims of Legal Positivism and its
alternatives in the years since 1958, it is not clear that the points that
Hart and Fuller were attempting to win against one another have precise
contemporary relevance. But the very fact of the debate—and
subsequent debates—shows that many legal scholars plant their flag
largely on semantic agreement as the form of massive agreement about

517-19 (2013) (“Even an exclusive legal positivist might deny that all legal content is the product of
the full set of legally operative texts.”). For a lighthearted discussion of the long-standing debates
over the possibility that law cannot live on text alone, see Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism,
29 J.L. & POL. 309, 314-22 (2014).
92. Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109
(2008) (abstract) (“The 1958 debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review is one of the landmarks of modern jurisprudence.”).
93. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 8, at 417.
94. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 606-07 (1958).
95. Id.; Schauer, supra note 92, at 1119 (“Hart’s claim, at least in 1958, was that the statutory
language, as language, would generate some number of clear or core applications. . . .”).
96. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 662-65 (1958).
97. This is emphatically not the argument from “weird cases.” See Schauer, supra note 8, at
420-23. The question is instead whether Fuller was not right that the world is such that hard cases
proliferate to such a degree as to render even an admittedly large number of easy cases
comparatively small. Cf. id. at 427-28.
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the law that people share.98 On this view, it is semantic agreement that
makes easy cases easy, and since language is widely considered to be a
conventional practice—we can only understand one another because of
shared meanings we have developed together99—this at least makes
much of law, if not all of law, conventional as well.
There are two problems with these claims, one of which can only
be flagged for later, the other of which will be addressed in the section
immediately following this one. First, what must be flagged for later is
whether our choice of theory should be affected at all if, in fact,
semantic agreement is the form of massive agreement we all share.
Because of language’s conventionality, it can be used as a tool. In
particular, a clever polity might coopt language for use in
operationalizing, or instantiating, or creating a “conception” of legal
rules, legal principles, or legal propositions. But it should be noticed that
semantic agreement does not make law uniquely law at all—instead it is
used to instantiate law derived from some other source. Put another way,
because language is a tool—much like a fence or a wall—it need not
itself be the law. A wall is not the law, though it may instantiate the law
by preventing trespass. Perhaps in the same way, a statute threatening
sanctions for trespass is not the law either, even though it also prevents
trespass. In this way, the question of which comes first—the language or
the law—bedevils legal theory and our understandings of legal
agreement. This argument, that legal propositions are frequently, if not
always, merely gloss on the law; that language primarily operationalizes
other norms; and, that as such legal propositions are frequently, if not
98. See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1296
(2014) (calling this “the Standard Picture”: “According to this vague picture—I hesitate to call it a
theory—the content of the law is primarily constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated
with the authoritative legal texts. The Standard Picture is extremely widely taken for granted, and
assumed to be common ground (though it is rarely explicitly espoused).”); Leiter, Explaining
Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1230 (“Someone familiar with mundane legal practice—
the ordinary problems and issues that arise, most of which do not lead to litigation—might
reasonably conclude that if there is a governing rule of interpretation at work in law, it is something
like ‘ordinary meaning controls, except when its import is absurd or repugnant, at which point
interpretive opportunism takes hold.’”); Schauer, supra note 8, at 414-20.
99. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 242 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968) (“If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.”); id. §§ 225-27 (discussing
agreement about correct solutions to mathematical problems); see also SAUL A. KRIPKE,
WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION 96 (1982)
(“On Wittgenstein’s conception, such agreement is essential for our game of ascribing rules and
concepts to each other”); id. at 86-113 (explaining that Wittgenstein stresses importance of
agreement about correct use of rules and concepts, and of “shared form of life” for deciphering
meaning).
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always vulnerable to point-of-application attacks via challenges to their
merits, may pose a powerful alternative to Legal Positivism.100
Second, all sides concede that semantic meaning does not cover the
entire scope of legal agreement and disagreement in any event. Some
legal decisions fly in the face of absolutely clear language, and yet all
sides agree that they should do so.101 In some cases, judges and litigants
seem to argue over issues as if the language is only a starting point for
general historical, moral or political debate.102 The next section takes up
this sort of content agreement: legal content agreement.
2. Legal Content Agreement
Still preoccupied with recovering the meaning of our hypothetical
statute, but having acknowledged the limits of language, we might posit
the existence of a kind of content agreement that involves specialized
understandings, unique to law, legal practice, and American legal
culture. This essay adopts Lawrence Solum’s notion of “legal content”
agreement because the label itself communicates the idea well.103 There
are a thousand ways that this form of agreement is described—
sometimes it is called recourse to practical reason,104 or explained
through the ideas of legal and cultural narrative105 or ideology,106 or
100. See COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 161-73 (noting Positivism offers no theory for
determining or identifying “legal content” and explaining that “[t]o his credit, Dworkin has done
more than anyone else to develop a general theory of legal content.”).
101. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 515-20 (1988).
102. This kind of interpretation is perhaps best summed up and explained by the line, “we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); accord Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 443 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (elaborating on the admonition). This idea creates a set of
boundaries and expectations: an entire normative universe; quite different than if one is expounding
the rules of Chess.
103. Solum, supra note 91, at 509-10; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten
Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1937-40 (2013).
104. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1992) (“Practical reason, unfortunately, is
easier to invoke than to define.”); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 28-29 (1986).
105. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-10 (1983) (“We
inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. . . . In this normative world, law and narrative are
inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse—to be
supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”); Lawrence B.
Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 597, 610, 621 (2010)
(“Narratives structure our understanding of the world . . . .”).
106. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Ideology As Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1991); J.
M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 199-200 (1990); Jack M. Balkin,
Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV. 392, 422
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professional conventions,107 or membership in a shared interpretive
community,108 or the experience of a “shared form of life.”109 Other
times it is called “construction”110 or interpretation in “context.”111
All of these are efforts to get at the idea that language itself does
not exhaust the kinds of content agreement we might have merely by
virtue of its conventions alone. You need to be from the place, perhaps
socialized in the practice, to understand what is actually being
referenced, commanded, allowed, prohibited, or created by its law.112
Legal content agreement is not quite the same as technical meaning—it
is neither truer nor more accurate than some other meaning—but rather,
is understood differently because its meaning is made in a particular
time and place, among a particular set of actors, acting in particular
roles.
There are many famous illustrations depicting the distinction
between semantic content and legal content agreement.113 Often, legal
content agreement is tacitly reduced to the idea that words, phrases, and
(1987); Denis J. Brion, Rhetoric and the Law of Enterprise, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117, 157-59
(1991); Segall, supra note 7, at 1031 (“CLS argues that there are easy cases and that law is
relatively stable only because judges interpreting the law share common values and ideals.”).
107. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 125 (1984); Millon,
supra note 90, at 30.
108. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746
(1982); Millon, supra note 90, at 21.
109. See, e.g., KRIPKE, supra note 99, at 96.
110. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 103 (2010).
111. David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 14-15 (David Kairys ed.,
1982); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395,
396-97 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1174-82 (1993).
112. Put another way, “Deathstar,” “Hydrospanner,” “Force,” and “Lightsaber” mean very
different things to Han Solo and Harrison Ford. So too do words like “droid,” “pilot,” “smuggler,”
“republic,” and “parsec.” This parlor game can be played across a number of different domains all
in service of the same point—”Hunger Games” means something very different to Katniss Everdeen
than Jennifer Lawrence. “The Matrix” means something very different to Neo than Keanu Reeves,
etc.
113. See, e.g., Tutt, supra note 91, at 320 (describing the legal-versus-semantic content debate
in United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990) over whether PCP and blotter
paper are a “mixture” of PCP and blotter paper “resulting in an enormous sentencing enhancement
for those unfortunate enough to transport their PCP via blotter paper and not some lighter means”);
id. at 320-21 (describing the legal-versus-semantic content debate in Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223 (1993) over whether it counts as “using” a gun “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug
trafficking crime” to offer to trade a gun for cocaine); Greenberg, supra, note 98, at 1291-92
(discussing the same case); Tutt, supra note 91, at 338-39 (describing FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) where the Supreme Court divided 5-4 over whether the FDA had
authority to regulate cigarettes “even though nicotine is a ‘drug’ and the FDA has the authority to
regulate ‘drug delivery devices’”).
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documents acquire specialized content through their history and
development as uniquely legal materials. In this way, the First
Amendment114 and Eighth Amendment mean both more and less than
the full semantic import of their words.115 No statute can be read without
careful attention to what past courts have said about its meaning even if
that results in a slow, steady drift further and further from the semantic
meaning of its words.116
Legal content agreement sweeps far beyond the idea that text on a
particular document might mean something other than what it would
mean to a reasonably able reader of English unfamiliar with America’s
legal customs and traditions.117 For instance, the very ability to identify
legal materials as legal materials frequently stems from agreement about
what counts as a valid legal source without looking to any particular
text.
Phillip Bobbitt’s identification of six “modalities” of constitutional
argument is probably among the finest explanations of what we mean
when we refer to legal content agreement apart from semantic
agreement. The six modalities are textual, historical, structural,
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments, and each can be objectively
regarded as a legitimate method of determining constitutional
meaning.118 While Bobbitt self-consciously presented his modalities as
the key to legitimizing judicial review (because the objective nature of
these modalities means that the Supreme Court’s decisions striking
down unconstitutional laws can be shown to be impartial, rather than

114. Solum, supra note 91, at 480.
115. Dworkin, supra note 89, at 119-27.
116. See, e.g. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 729 (1988) (“Given existing interpretations of our civil liberties guarantees,
precisely what does it mean to assert that there is a textual Bill of Rights, apart from fixing some
outer perimeter limiting judicial decisionmaking?”). Apologies must be made for the continual
focus on Constitutional texts. Such a focus is not required. The Administrative Procedure Act and
the Sherman Act are two federal laws whose interpretations have also become almost fully
untethered from their words. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There A Text in This
Class?”: The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 620
(2005) (“Antitrust cases generally discuss precedent and economic policy. They rarely include more
than a passing citation to the statutory text.”); Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389, 1421 (1996) (“For Justice Jackson, the fact that the Act may have
‘contain[ed] many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities’ was an invitation
to an activist, constructive judicial role.”).
117. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 418 (arguing that semantic content agreement is responsible
for most legal agreement because “[h]owever sketchy and distorted the understanding it might be,”
reading a legally authoritative source still imparts an immense amount of legal information because
it is written in English).
118. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982).
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political), more interesting for purposes of understanding legal content
agreement is that the six modalities of constitutional argument do in fact
canvass nearly the whole terrain of legal argument.119 Bobbitt
recognized that this conventionality was arbitrary, calling it “a legal
grammar that we all share and that we have all mastered,” but noting that
“arguments are conventions . . . they could be different, but . . . then we
would be different.”120 Nonetheless, textual, historical, structural,
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments were “the kinds of
arguments one finds in judicial opinions, in hearings, and in briefs.”121
No one asks why these arguments—and not some other set—appear to
be the legitimate modes of not just constitutional argument, but much
legal argument in American law.122 In this way, an imperceptible set of
conventions channel and structure our thinking about how legal
propositions should be decided.
Embedded in this modal structure is the interesting insight that only
one of the six modes of legal argument is actually grounded in semantic
content agreement. The other five (historical, structural, prudential,
doctrinal, and ethical arguments)—so pervasive in law and essential
elements of legal agreement—are not rooted in what the law’s words
say. They do not depend on language conventions. As such, it is possible
to talk about different senses of legality, because it is possible to talk
about argumentation within one convention to the exclusion of the
others. One can talk about what the Constitution’s text means, or what
its history dictates, for instance, without actually talking about what
legal rights individuals have under it, because, for example, the
decisions of the Warren Court mean that regardless of the Constitution’s
text and history, the constitution demands that a Miranda warning be
read,123 evidence obtained by an illegal search be excluded,124 and
violations of the Fourth Amendment be remediable via a Bivens action
119. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22 (1991); id. at 24 (“If we
want to understand the ideological and political commitments in law, we have to study the grammar
of law, that system of logical constraints that the practices of legal activities have developed in our
particular culture. A study of the modalities gives us such a description.”); id. at 27 (“Once we
looked carefully at constitutional argument, it became apparent that the legitimacy of judicial
review was maintained by adherence to these forms of argument. An opinion stated in these terms
was accepted as legitimate and so also for briefs and oral arguments, whereas other forms of
argument, some acceptable in other legal cultures, rendered a decision quite illegitimate . . . .”).
120. BOBBITT, supra note 118, at 6.
121. Id.
122. See also J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1771, 1776-80 (1994) (objecting).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2

238

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:215

in federal court.125
Even these legal grammars change over time. H. Jefferson Powell’s
research into the legal culture of the founding generation and the early
Supreme Court have shown that that generation possessed ideas about
how to understand legal commands, legal authority, and legal texts far
different from our own.126 Semantic content was an essential and
decisive element of constitutional argument, but invocation of
extratextual principles—rights and duties embedded in a higher Natural
Law—were frequent.127 Legislatures, state and federal, and certainly the
President, were thought by many to be coequal legal interpreters and
expositors.128 The Americans constructed a shared legal-political
grammar in a remarkably short period out of materials they had readily
at hand, namely the tools of religious and scholarly interpretation that
informed other areas of political and social life.129 Yet only some of
those practices arose from text. Agreement on the rest was tacit. It was,
as Legal Positivists would say, conventional.

125. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
126. For the sources undergirding the discussion in this paragraph, see H. Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 642-62 (1993); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949 (1993); H.
Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); and H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
127. See Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, supra note 126, at 96468 (“American constitutional discourse in this period was not conducted solely in terms of
arguments from, or about the meaning of, the texts of the federal and state constitutions. Indeed, a
striking feature of early constitutional debate was the invocation of a veritable host of extratextual
authorities: ‘the spirit of the Constitution’; the ‘fundamental principles’ of the constitution, of free
government, or of republicanism; ‘natural justice’; and so on.”).
128. Id. at 974-85 (“[A] major theme in early constitutional debate concerned rival claims of
interpretive authority. Various people during the period claimed major roles in constitutional
interpretation for Congress, the President, the federal courts, the state legislatures, the state courts,
and state conventions; the two primary disputes were over the finality of judicial interpretation, and
the identity of ultimate interpretive authority in the federal Union.”).
129. Id. at 1008 (“Viewed from the perspective of specific political issues, the founding era
appears to have been a time of remarkably widespread constitutional dissension. . . . The founding
era’s very real battles over substantive constitutional questions, however, were articulated-indeed,
were made possible-by the emergence of a common set of ideas, problems, and structures of
argument.”); see also Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note 126, at
887-88 (explaining that “cultural influences of Enlightenment rationalism and British Protestantism
combined in an unlikely alliance” opposite the interpretive practices drawn from “[t]he rich
interpretive tradition of the English common law”—though the interpretive practices of the common
law ultimately won out).
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3. Limits of Content Agreement
It would be both tidy and compelling to conclude that content
agreements and disagreements exhaust the kinds of agreement and
disagreement we might have. There can be no doubt that agreements of
these two kinds cover an immeasurably enormous territory. Where
semantic content agreement fails, legal content agreement points us
toward authoritative sources and can fill in many of the gaps or holes in
what the statute, precedent, or past practice means.
Moreover, we do experience fulsome and meaningful
disagreements over language and law rooted only in pure disagreements
about its content. Language is conventional, but its adoption by native
speakers, and their sense of proper usage, is unconscious. A native
speaker can articulate that a particular usage is proper or improper
according to both conscious and unconscious understandings. She can
articulate theories of these usages and adopt prescriptive accounts of
how language should be spoken and used even though she is a mere
participant in the shared practice.130 Native English speakers learn
English in schools precisely so they can understand and articulate the
usages of their own language in a useful manner.131
By the same token, however, disagreements about language
frequently are not purely rooted in disagreements about content. Not
infrequently, disagreements about language are about how English
should be spoken, rather than how it is spoken. Admittedly, few would
say that having a strong opinion about the proper usage of the word
“whom” is necessarily a moral opinion. But no one would deny that
having a strong opinion about the proper usage of language is
normative—whether that normativity is rooted in a descriptivist or
prescriptivist view of language—and to the degree it affects how we
understand one another, this has important implications for language, for
law, and potentially for all human endeavors.132
Thus, even content agreements do not exhaust the forms of
agreement. In our weaker moments, we might be tempted to say that

130. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1779.
131. See Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, supra note 106, at 200-01.
132. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 558 (2010)
(“In Law’s Empire, interpretivism [a normative theory] governs all of law. And in Hedgehogs,
interpretivism provides the normative theory for all human endeavors except science. If this pattern
continues, we might expect that Dworkin’s next book will take up the philosophy of science,
extending interpretivism to this final domain.”); see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at
1774 (“[A]s a normative matter, the grammarian has the right, just as any other speaker does, to
attempt to influence the course and development of the language she studies.”).
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legal agreement and disagreement are captured entirely by semantic and
legal content agreements and disagreements, and that disagreements of
all other kinds are somehow non-legal disagreements. They are
arguments about the proper application of admitted discretion, for
example. But while content agreement could be the source of a great
deal of agreement about law, even Legal Positivists must concede it is
not the only such source of legal agreement. In fact, there is strong
reason to believe that content agreement is not—or cannot be—the kind
of agreement Legal Positivists are referring to when they speak of
massive agreement about what the law is.
D.

Extensional and Intensional Agreement

Even in the shared usages of language and law, there is a vast area
of potential disagreement in the space between the description and the
described. Here, we cannot say there is agreement about content because
the content of the description is inadequate. Instead, we must say there is
agreement about how to reason about, or extend, a vague or ambiguous
concept—one admittedly lacking in deducible content. This kind of
meaning-making, which this Essay calls “extensional and intensional” is
a fact of life, though it is uncomfortable because it involves the
imputation of content where no content existed before.133 It is
unavoidably normative in character.
Examples of extensional and intensional agreement abound.
Language is an imperfect medium, so both speakers and listeners often
confront situations in which they say more or less than they intend, or
understand more or less than they should.134 When I describe a chair, for
instance, and mean to refer to a special kind of professional accolade
rather than article of furniture,135 that usages create a kind of confusion.
If I did not realize that what I sought to communicate would have a
double-effect, and did not clarify it, my statement would either be
misunderstood or ambiguous. If context did not give away my meaning,
it would be impossible to tell what was intended. In such a situation, the
listener must reason about what was meant. The content of the statement
133. This terminology has been used elsewhere in discussion of this topic, if only rarely. See,
e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 324-25 (1997).
134. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION 62-63 (2010) (“[T]ry to define ‘book’ or ‘pen’ or anything else in your immediate
reach so that your definition includes all instances of the concept and not much else; you will find
the task both daunting and time-consuming.”).
135. For example, the “Chair” of the History Department or the Honorable George J. Mitchell,
L’61 “Chair” in Law and Public Policy.
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is not deducible, and the process of deriving it is not necessarily rooted
in a shared form of life. The meanings of phrases that are vague by
nature, such as “a little” or “a lot” are also difficult to deduce.136
Affixing meaning to many seemingly simple statements is therefore
unavoidable normative because it involves the exercise of judgment on
the basis of an extraordinary amount of often unknown and ineffable
criteria (it is normative because deciding that you will derive my
meaning based on your thoughts about what I should have meant is
normative unless you and I share a more general agreement that we will
look to certain rules in resolving doubts137 ). For example, saying that
“reasonable delays will be excused” is not necessarily an invitation to
legislate what counts as “reasonable.” It could mean that one (e.g., a
judge) should look to a library of prior decisions as a basis for
determining what is reasonable. However, it could be an invitation to
exercise personal judgment and discretion on a case-by-case basis. In
other words, at the zeroth step, a judge must decide in what manner to
understand how much discretion has been delegated—if any at all—
when confronted with a statute requiring the application of
reasonableness.
Extensional and intensional interpretations arise precisely when
semantic and legal content agreement run out. No longer can the listener
and the speaker say that they share a mutual understanding about how to
deduce the content of a statement. The listener has to impute, one way or
another, what the listener thinks the speaker meant. The same is true of
imputation of the legal effect of a particular legal claim or material. Of
course, it must be admitted that there might even be massive agreement
about how to impute the content of vague or ambiguous legal materials.
After all, extensional agreement would just be agreement about how to
reason from a particular quantum of evidence. Extensional agreement
would therefore exist where a speaker, upon seeing his statement
interpreted, would fill the same gaps in meaning in the same manner
and, therefore, arrive at the same result. We do this all the time. In that
way, content agreement plus extensional agreement (where gaps exist)
could be the kind of massive agreement that Legal Positivists describe

136. I distinguish between ambiguity, which deals in matters of kind, and vagueness, which
deals in matters of degree. Dworkin distinguished them as the difference between “testing or pivotal
cases” and “borderline cases.” DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 41.
137. In law, that would be legal content agreement, and then your statement would not be
vague or ambiguous anyway. “A lot” would not really mean “a lot”—it would mean, look to some
rule we share for deducing how much “a lot” is, and use that amount. It would become a tacit unit of
measure.
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when they describe massive agreement.
There are innumerable forms of extensional agreement because it
involves settling on shared meanings on the basis of incomplete content.
Four broad categories have formed important aspects of debates in
jurisprudence, usually in the context of showing that much of law is
animated by disagreement. They are: (1) paradigmatic agreement (2)
criterial agreement, (3) theoretical agreement, and (4) incompletely
theorized agreement. This section describes them briefly.
1. Paradigmatic Agreement
Paradigmatic agreement arises when we do not agree on the
overarching concept, but we agree about certain paradigm instances of
the concept.138 With ambiguous concepts like “art”, we might select
individual paintings, movies, or novels and say that we agree that they
are in the class. For vehicles, it might be planes, trains, and automobiles,
as well as a hodgepodge of more exotic motorized devices. For vague
concepts, like many and few, or a lot and a little, or jumbo and micro, or
purple, we might attempt to settle on our individual understandings of
the supremum (the least upper bound) and infimum (the greatest lower
bound). If we are fortunate, we need never totally agree on how much,
exactly, is too much or too little.
Notice however, that paradigmatic agreement is not agreement on
the content of the concept.139 It is something less. It is recourse to
another form of judgment. We must negotiate with one another to settle
on the contours of the concept through appeals to paradigms precisely
because we do not completely understand one another. Recourse to
paradigmatic agreement, therefore, introduces the possibility of
normativity in a way that semantic content agreement and legal content
agreement simply do not. It is fundamentally different.
To give an example, in a debate about whether or not Pluto is a
planet, two individuals might attempt to articulate paradigm cases of
“planet-ness” and then reason back from an individual celestial object’s
inclusion in the category as reason to also include Pluto (or not include
it). But when these arguments are marshaled, they are normative in
character even if two individuals agree on the ultimate outcome:
“Because Mercury is a planet, Pluto should be as well.” Or, “because
certain very large asteroids in the asteroid belt are not planets, Pluto also
138. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 277,
295 (1985).
139. See Millon, supra note 90, at 18-19 & n.54.
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should not be a planet.” These arguments from paradigm cases do not
help participants in the shared conversation to actually identify all those
objects which are and are not planets, nor even identify what criteria
make planets “planets” and not something else, but nonetheless can be
grounds for agreement and disagreement about how to resolve concrete
cases, such as whether Jupiter, Earth or Pluto are properly termed
planets or not. In a similar way, two individuals could agree about how
cases should be decided without ever agreeing on what the law actually
is.
2. Criterial Agreement
As the name suggests, criterial agreement arises when we do not
agree on the overarching concept, but we agree on criteria about it.140
More frequently, quite the opposite circumstance arises—we agree on
the concept but not all of its criteria. Because criterial disagreement is
another form of estimating what was meant—rather than deducing what
was meant—one can make recourse to criteria rather than paradigms in
resolving disputes over meaning.
When we do not simultaneously agree on all the criteria for
understanding, interpreting, or applying a concept, we enter something
that looks very much like prescriptivist grammarian mode. For example,
two individuals might be attempting to determine what it is that makes
something a “chair.” I think a chair is a piece of furniture with four legs
and a back. You think it is anything on which one can comfortably sit.
We each believe that there are different criteria for establishing what is
and is not a chair. In resolving our conflict, we might make appeals to
other forms of agreement to test whether our criterion hold in paradigm
cases, or are consistent with other evidence of the content of the
concept—I say, look it up in the dictionary; you say, look to what is
commonly described as a chair. I say are stools chairs? You say, are
Panton chairs not chairs? I say, look to the psycholinguistic studies:
when someone says, “chair,” the first thing that comes to mind is a fourlegged straight-backed piece of furniture. You say you can find too
many exceptions, from sculptures to tree stumps. We say to each other:
why is your evidence relevant? On and on we argue, even over
concededly constrained terrain, even using a shared legal grammar.141
By all outward signs, our disagreement appears normative, and it

140.
141.
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appears basic.142 One could have the disagreement even in the easiest of
easy cases. For example, a dispute over what it means for a vehicle to be
“in” the park, or the freedom of speech to be “abridged.” On the other
hand, there are many instances in which criteria of or for a concept have
been definitely settled and are now widely shared. Magic words and
rituals often work in this fashion—the ritual comes to be equated with
the concept itself, though they are not identical.
In contract law, for example, everyone knows that a signature
indicates that one is legally bound by a contract’s terms, even though
conceptually the basis of contract is that one has made a promise, not
that one has signed a piece of paper. But a signature has become so tied
to the notion of consent that it has become synonymous with it. One
might just as readily ask, “was there a signature?” in response to an
inquiry into whether a contract has been made as “was there a promise?”
Yet, to further demonstrate how easily agreement might mask
disagreement, two individuals might in fact disagree about whether a
signature is synonymous with consent (most would not think so, given
that fraud in the factum vitiates contractual consent, even with a
signature), or is only evidence of consent, or is a legally sufficient act to
make a binding contract even if it is not consent at all and it is known
that it is not. Though in the vast majority of cases, individuals with these
three highly divergent views about the criteria for contract formation
might agree on the outcome of a case or what the law requires given a
certain set of facts; nonetheless, they actually disagree fundamentally
about what the law is—i.e., what makes a contract enforceable and why.
3. Theoretical Agreement
Theoretical agreement is the conceptual obverse of criterial
agreement—rather than attempting to determine the meaning of a
concept by recourse to criteria that might give shape to its contours, we
reason from the category of which the concept is thought to be a
member.143 Most often, theoretical agreement is witnessed in the form of
142. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1778.
143. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1760 (1995) (“There is often good reason for judges to raise the level of abstraction and ultimately
to resort to large-scale theory. As a practical matter, discrete judgments about particular cases will
often prove inadequate. Sometimes, people do not have clear intuitions about how cases should
come out. Sometimes, seemingly similar cases provoke different reactions, and it is necessary to
raise the level of theoretical ambition to explain whether those different reactions are justified or to
show that the seemingly similar cases are different after all. Sometimes, different people simply
disagree. By looking at broader principles, we may be able to mediate the disagreement. In any
case, there is a problem of explaining our considered judgments about particular cases – to make
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reason giving, and it is a powerful means of agreeing (or disagreeing)
because it elevates the generality of agreement and disagreement.144
Theoretical agreement is then a kind of agreement about a more general
concept from which the meaning of the concept under consideration can
be deduced by virtue of its relationship to or with it. Principles, shared
fundamental norms and values: these are types of theoretical agreements
we might have. Theoretical agreement is still not agreement about the
specific concept at issue, but if there is generalized agreement about how
to reason from more general concepts to more specific ones, then
theoretical agreements can fill gaps without requiring particular
agreement.
For example, in a dispute over whether an individual should have a
right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding, two individuals might
argue about what it is that makes a right to counsel necessary in any
given adversary proceeding. One might argue that it is the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee that an individual be provided counsel, and that
without that specific commitment, there would not even be a right to
counsel in criminal cases. Another might argue that it is the Fifth
Amendment’s right to due process of law that undergirds the right to
counsel and that, even if the Sixth Amendment did not exist, there would
be a fundamental right to be represented by counsel in any adversary
proceeding in which a person’s liberty was at stake. In determining the
scope of the right to counsel, these two individuals would not be arguing
with one another about the concept of the right to counsel, but rather
about the theory that gives rise to it, and the category of which it is
thought to be a part.
Theoretical agreement is by no means necessary to come to
agreement about the meaning of a concept. Two individuals might
disagree on the theory that gives rise to the right to counsel—one might
think that the right is rooted in the specific textual dictates of the Sixth
Amendment and another in the dictates of fundamental fairness—but
both might still agree that counsel is or is not warranted in a broad
sure that they are not just an accident – and at some point, the law may well want to offer that
explanation. Ambitious thinkers might therefore urge that low-level principles may conflict with
one another or be demonstrably wrong. In these circumstances, judges might well resort to higher
theory.”)
144. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 231 (2004)
(“Reason-giving is a pervasive and frequently praised feature of legal decision-making, and a legal
decision-maker who provides reasons for her decisions is considered a better legal decision-maker
than one who does not.”); Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1738 (explaining that “[i]t is customary to
lament an outcome that has not been completely theorized, on the ground that any such outcome has
been inadequately justified.”).
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number of adversarial cases where the stakes are low enough that neither
theory dictates there be counsel, or the stakes are high enough that both
theories give rise to such a right (one might imagine a kind of juvenile
delinquency hearing so nearly criminal in its nature, for example, that it
still gives rise to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Even though they
lack theoretical agreement, these two individuals nonetheless can come
to a consensus about what the law is in innumerable cases.
4. Incompletely Theorized Agreement
The final kind of agreement that will be presented in this brief
sketch of the landscape of normative interpretive agreements (perhaps
the most important kind) is incompletely theorized agreement.145 On its
face, incompletely theorized agreement is not really agreement at all. It
is really agreement about how to disagree. When faced with a truly
intractable disagreement about a particular contested proposition, those
in search of incompletely theorized agreement will move to levels of
greater and greater particularity in search of agreement.146 They are
“agreements without theory” dependent on recourse to “rules and
analogies.”147 As such, incompletely theorized agreements are actually
brokered agreements.148 Nonetheless, they produce what appears to be
consensus, namely consensus on outcomes, and therefore play an
extremely important role in interpretive disputes of all kinds.
These types of agreements are brokered in the sense that they are a
product of true compromise, and do not necessarily reflect anything we
would ordinarily regard as agreement about a contested concept or
proposition. Settlements in private law, where an individual or entity
agrees to pay a sum certain rather than bear the risk of litigation, is an
example of this phenomenon in action. Here, the law specifically
provides a mechanism for negotiating over a legal proposition without
resolving anything about its merits. Multimember courts also frequently
craft decisions and opinions in which it is the case that there may not
have been consensus regarding many of the statements concerning what
the law is or what it requires in the majority opinion. Once imprinted in
a judicial opinion (a conventional source of law), a proposition can
become law though literally no individual lawyer or judge ever came to
145. Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1735-36; see Cass R. Sunstein, Tanner Lectures on Human
Values at Harvard Univ.: Political Conflict and Legal Agreement 138, 141 (Nov. 29 – Dec. 1,
1994), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/Sunstein96.pdf.
146. Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1736.
147. Id. at 1739, 1743.
148. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 969-72.
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agreement about it. In this way, law can bubble up from the aether,
without agreement of any kind whatsoever.
There can be no doubt that agreement to disagree is an important
kind of agreement, and it is a key task of the legal system to be able to
handle situations in which agreement cannot be reached. Yet, it is hard
not to see the decision to compromise—to decide there is no sense in
continuing to seek consensus on the meaning of a contested concept—as
a fundamentally normative decision. Indeed, of the kinds of agreement,
it is perhaps the kind that most openly acknowledges its explicitly meritbased character, accounting for the idea that two individuals operating in
good faith can fundamentally disagree about what the law requires so
substantially that they will never come to consensus in any reasonable
amount of time.
5. The Limits of Extensional and Intensional Agreement
To take account: beginning first with existential agreement about
law, it is probably not the case that there exists massive agreement about
what laws there are. Moving next to semantic content and legal content
agreement, it seemed more plausible that claims to massive agreement
were really meant to cover that territory. But it was also clear that mere
semantic content agreement was not enough to create widespread
pervasive agreement about law, and even with the addition of legal
content agreement to fill gaps, it was easy to imagine innumerable cases
where social practices themselves would be insufficient to make most
cases easy. Moving to extensional and intensional agreement, it was
apparent that there exist innumerable kinds of such agreement—since
they are really forms of normative argument, rather than true
agreement—but it was posited that it could be the case nonetheless that
massive agreement about the law is meant to encompass widespread
agreement even about the proper resolution of these normative
arguments. If that last proposition were true—and we not only
experienced widespread semantic and legal content agreement but also
massive agreement about how to extend concepts when there is no
content agreement—would that be what is meant by the claim that there
is widespread agreement about what the law is?
Probably not. As Justice Holmes once put it, “general propositions
do not decide concrete cases.”149 There is an entire social practice that
has been hanging over this discussion—which is that in the American

149.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

Hart, supra note 94, at 614.

33

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2

248

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:215

system of law at least, the primary legal interpreters are judges and the
primary method of expounding the law is through cases. In our entire
discussion of legal agreement, we have barely touched on judges and the
cases they decide. Yet, the reality that law is bound up with adjudication
is integral to the claim that there is widespread agreement about what the
law is.150
E.

Agreement About Decisions

One cannot talk about massive agreement about the law without
mentioning the most important situs of legal disagreement—the legal
case. Whether the kinds of agreement we care about are ultimately
lensed through discussion of semantic and legal content, or other forms
of agreement, a prediction about how a case will be decided was the
centerpiece of arguments about law for centuries. The possibility that we
might be talking about what a judge will do in fact when we talk about
what “the law” is has a history in American law dating back to the
writings of Justice Holmes,151 to those of the Legal Realists and Hartian
Positivists,152 and onto contemporary debates over the concept and
nature of law.153 This debate has become more sophisticated as the
century has progressed, and most lawyers and scholars speaking
technically no longer believe that the legal case should be the primary
locus of debate about what determines what the law is—especially if the
question is legal agreement.154 Nonetheless, this section will cover it
150. After all, those who make the claim that there is widespread agreement immediately tie
the claim to agreement about cases. See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra
note 7, at 1227 (“[I]f there were not massive convergence about what the law is, we should expect
the universe of legal cases to look less like a pyramid and more like a lopsided square, whose base
was perhaps somewhat bigger than its top.”); Schauer, supra note 8, at 413 (“Following the law is a
legal event, and the vast majority of these legal events are easy cases.”).
151. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897).
152. HART, supra note 33, at 137.
153. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial
Comparison, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1, 37
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“[Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire] is not so much an explanation of the
law as a sustained argument about how courts, especially American and British courts, should
decide cases. It contains a theory of adjudication rather than a theory of (the nature of) law.
Dworkin’s failure to allow that the two are not the same is one reason for the failure of his
conception of the tasks and method of jurisprudence.”).
154. See Frederick Schauer, (Re)taking Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852, 874-76 & nn.74-81
(2006) (reviewing NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM (2004)) (presenting the arguments explaining why the method by which a legal system
performs adjudication is irrelevant to Legal Positivism’s core claims; many theorists hold that Legal
Positivism is agnostic as to how legal cases are decided as long as the Rule of Recognition “is a
product of contingent human decision, a social fact, rather than . . . a necessary feature of any legal
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briefly.
Justice Holmes enunciated the hypothetical of a bad man whose
only concern was with legal sanction, and took him as the ultimate test
of what we mean by law. According to Holmes, “if we take the view of
our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws”
for legal reason, justification, principles, or rules.155 He wants only to
“know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in
fact.”156 Confessed Holmes, “I am much of his mind. The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law.”157 Justice Holmes’ aphorism became the rallying cry
of Legal Realism—since the imposition of legal sanction by a court is
frequently the most profound result of writing down the laws.
But law would mean very little if it only commanded then
threatened sanction for non-compliance. It would mean even less if all it
entailed was our predictions about what we could be punished for doing.
We would need considerably more judges and police if all that kept the
populace from breaking the law was the fear that we could be punished
for doing so. There is something frayed about predicting what courts will
do in fact and calling it the law. Hart called it a “threadbare”
conception.158 The idea that law is the combination of command and
sanction “if you take these notions at all precisely, is like that of a
gunman saying to his victim, ‘Give me your money or your life.’” If law
were defined by its capacity to inflict punishment, it would have no
greater claim to legitimacy than an ordinary threat, and the decision to
comply with the law would be no different from a decision to comply
with a threat. According to Hart, “Law surely is not the gunman situation
writ large, and legal order is surely not to be thus simply identified with
compulsion.”159
One reason that it is not useful to talk about how cases will be
decided is that so few “legal events”—events in the world where law
bears on what might happen—will ever get within a country mile of a
courthouse.160 Individuals comply with the law regularly, even when no
one is around to enforce it. We frequently follow the law because it is
system.”).
155. Holmes, supra note 151, at 457.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 460-61.
158. Id.
159. Hart, supra note 94, at 603.
160. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 413-14 (adopting the “legal event” terminology to describe
“the divergence between the behavior that would have occurred but for the law and the behavior
that occurred because of the law”).
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the law and for no other reason. By the same token, the law is broken
constantly, sometimes in view of the police, often without fear of
sanction. We frequently double-park, trespass, jaywalk, spit, littler,
speed, and loiter without fear. Even in fraught situations in which the
police are involved or legally operative materials are in play, the notion
that a court will become involved—that lawyers will become involved—
is remote. We promise, injure, harass, intrude, convert, and trespass with
far greater fear of social sanction than any legal sanction by a judge
somewhere in a faraway courtroom. Life is too short. Yet, law still
operates. Law has the power to guide conduct even when it can never be
enforced by a judge, and by the same token, some laws do not guide
conduct even when they could.
Another reason it is not useful to talk about how cases will be
decided is that, for all we like to say about it, there is a distinction we
each can draw about cases on the law and cases on the votes.
Collegiality and civility—not to mention politics—enter into the
consideration of actual cases, though many of us think that they should
not.161 Many law professors believed that the Affordable Care Act would
be held to be constitutional—that the case was an “easy” one on the law
governing the Commerce Clause.162 Instead, the case was lost 5-4.163 A
social movement emanating from partisan political structures created the
ideological conditions necessary to allow the Supreme Court to make
this decision.164 Many law professors would have been quick to tell you
161. Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1759 (“Dworkin’s patient and resourceful judge—could not
really participate in ordinary judicial deliberations. He would probably be seen as a usurper, even an
oddball. On a single-judge court, he would suffer from the vice of hubris. On a multimember panel,
he would lack some of the crucial virtues of a participant in legal deliberation. These virtues include
collegiality and civility, which incline judges toward the lowest level of abstraction necessary to
decide a case.”)
162. See David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against
PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2014) (“Virtually all law professors . . . agreed that all of
the constitutional challenges to PPACA were meritless—and the federal courts would make short
work of the litigation. Indeed, as Professor Aziz Huq (University of Chicago) observed, ‘[a]mong
constitutional scholars, the puzzle is not how the federal government can defend the new law, but
why anyone thinks a constitutional challenge is even worth making.’ In 2009, Professor Jack Balkin
(Yale University) similarly observed that ‘the idea that the Act’s mandate to purchase health
insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of most legal professionals and academics,
simply crazy.’ Professor Akhil Amar (Yale University) declared that based on his three decades of
studying the Constitution, PPACA ‘easily passes constitutional muster.’”).
163. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S. 2012).
164. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge
Went
Mainstream,
ATLANTIC
(June
4,
2012,
2:55
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-themandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040 (“Was there a magic moment when the challenge to
the mandate moved from off the wall to on the wall? There are many possible candidates. But the
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that it was only because of this shift in the social conditions surrounding
the case that the Justices felt the freedom to vote the way that they did,
and that the decision was inconsistent with nearly two centuries of
American constitutional law.165 Some cases that were in no way easy—
Brown v. Board of Education or United States v. Nixon—went 9-0
because “a complex array of institutional and political considerations
made it important that there be no dissenters in either case.”166 The early
Supreme Court, and indeed the modern Supreme Court at various times,
has discouraged the airing of dissents and concurrences in order to
strengthen the institution of the Court even at the expense of false
certainty over the ease of decisions about the law.167
Moreover, in a scenario in which panels are multi-member, there is
the possibility that the opinion represents no single person’s
understanding of the law. There may literally be no individual human
being in the world who agrees with the majority opinion in toto, but
because of the compromises necessary to secure a majority, the law is
established as it is. There “may also be complex bargaining issues as
some officials or judges seek to implement a broad theory as part of the
outcome, while others seek a narrow theory, and still others are
undecided between the two.”168
A final reason it may not be useful to talk about cases is the
outcomes of cases are frequently over-determined. Multiple intersecting
legal rules mean that there is no conceivable path from point A to point
most important ingredient was the overwhelming support of the Republican Party and its associated
institutions for the challenge.”).
165. See Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted The Law in
TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2011),
Striking
Down
Healthcare
Reform,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/06/opinion/la-oe-amar-health-care-legal-20110206 (“I strive to
be apolitical in evaluating students and judges alike. Over the years, many of my favorite students
have been proud conservatives, while others have been flaming liberals. The Constitution belongs to
neither party.”).
166. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 414-20.
167. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 432 (1986)
(“[U]nanimity underscores the gravity of a constitutional imperative—witness Brown v. Board of
Education and Cooper v. Aaron.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1185, 1189-91 (1992) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall instituted the practice of
issuing opinions for the Court as a method of strengthening the Supreme Court as an institution, and
praising the practice); G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70
VA. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1984) (explaining various ways in which the Marshall Court’s “opinion of the
Court” practice gave a “false impression of unanimity”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169, 171 (Paul L.
Ford ed., 1899) (criticizing Chief Justice Marshall for suppressing dissents and lending a false sense
of unanimity to the decisions of the Supreme Court).
168. Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1737 n.11 (noting the possibility of this phenomenon and the
need for further study).
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Z, regardless of whether somewhere along that path a clearly defined
legal entitlement was plainly violated.169 Structuring claims around the
tort of negligence comes to mind. An individual can be negligent but
cause no harm, for instance, and therefore no tort action is ever brought.
No claim is ever adjudicated, but one can still say that she acted
negligently nonetheless. Claims against government officials who have
the power to invoke qualified and sovereign immunity in their defense
have a similar quality. There may be no liability, and therefore no
possibility of a lawsuit, even if there was a clear violation of a legal
duty. Class action certification incorporates the merits of the underlying
claim at several stages in the very act of pursuing the vehicle of the class
action—there must be standing, jurisdiction, numerosity, typicality,
commonality, adequacy, often also predominance and superiority, yet
the class action device is the only way in which the claim will ever arise
in a court because of exogenous economic, social, political, and
institutional considerations.
Nonetheless, all of us, in our less sophisticated moments, use the
shorthand of the judge sitting in judgment in a concrete legal dispute as
our paradigm instance of a determination of legal meaning. Rightly or
wrongly, it is probably the case that even if scholars know better,
educated lay people and even smart lawyers often think that when it is
asserted there is massive agreement about what the law is, what is meant
is that there is massive agreement about what the judges will do. But as
this section has sought to show, this is a problematic way to think about
legal agreement.
F.

Agreement About Propositions of Law and Legal Propositions

There is a final kind of legal agreement that must be discussed: the
notion that what is meant by massive agreement could be massive
agreement about legal propositions. Agreement about a legal proposition
is not the same as agreement about what the law says or even what it
means. Dworkin treated propositions of law as the foundation of his

169. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 36, at 462, 494-95 (“[I]t is pure nonsense to say that legal
doctrine is completely indeterminate even with respect to very hard cases. Even in the hardest hard
case, legal doctrine limits the court’s options. One of the parties will receive a judgment, not some
unexpected stranger; the relief will be related to the dispute at hand and will not be a declaration
that Mickey Mouse is the President of the United States. . . . the reason that easiest cases are not
‘cases’ at all is that the law’s relative determinacy does not permit us to make a ‘case’ out of them.
The very determinacy of the law prevents us from even recognizing them as cases in any grand
empirical study to determine the percentages of hard and easy cases.”).
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theory of law, and they are a useful way of thinking about law.170
According to Dworkin, propositions of law are “all the various
statements and claims people make about what the law allows or
prohibits or entitles them to have.”171 Propositions of law are thus
composites. They can be quite general, as Dworkin noted, they can be
mere recitations of statutory text. But they can also be quite specific—
incorporating within them specific references to hypothetical facts and
situations that might arise and the outcomes the law would dictate in
those situations. According to Dworkin, it is just as much a legal
proposition to state that “the law forbids states to deny anyone equal
protection within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” as it is to
say “the law does not provide compensation for fellow-servant injuries”
or “the law requires Acme Corporation to compensate John Smith for
the injury he suffered in its employ last February.”172
1. Agreement About What the Law Prohibits One From Doing,
Making, or Having
Thus, the claim to massive agreement could be a claim about how
to decide the truth of legal propositions, rather than about how to decide
what the law is. It is a determination of what the law does or does not
entitle, prohibit, or allow.
Of all the forms of agreement about the law that we might have,
this appears to be the most natural. It is agreement about the answers to
discrete propositional statements as opposed to empirical questions
about what the law says or is. The distinction is an important one. If
someone asks the question, “is murder illegal in the jurisdiction?” or “is
it illegal to kill?”, the answer will surely be yes in every jurisdiction
worth living in. But framed as a legal proposition, the inquiry becomes
both more concrete and more useful. “Does an individual have a right to
kill his attacker if there is no opportunity to retreat and he reasonably
fears for his life” might be the question, in which case the answer might
be “yes,” even though that proposition does not recite a “law” written
down anywhere dictating that result. That method of thinking about legal
agreement has much more of the texture of actual legal discussion,
applying law to fact, than the barren question, “what is the law?”173
170. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See also, e.g., Moore, supra note 138, at 280 n.6 (arguing that legal propositions are an
“idiosyncratic way[] of looking at law” because an “idea of law [that] focuses on those singular
propositions of law that decide particular cases (‘This contract is valid,’ for example)” fails “[t]o
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2. Agreement About What One is In Fact Prohibited From Doing,
Making, or Having
A final kind of massive agreement we may share may not just be
about propositions of law in the abstract, but about how the law operates
in fact. While this form of legal agreement is probably widely shared, it
is often difficult for the legal system to confront. Frequently, we
massively agree both about the answer to a proposition of law as a
formal language game, but also agree as to how the proposition actually
operates in fact. This second element is important because the legal
system could be considered manifestly and systematically unjust to the
extent we thought individuals and judges were systematically unaware
of how it operated in fact.174
This distinction between legal propositions in the abstract and legal
propositions in fact is sometimes known as the distinction between
concepts and conceptions,175 as under-enforced norms,176 or as the
distinction between operative rules and decision rules.177 It is the idea
that the law says one thing, but everyone knows it is a fiction. It is
something like the notion that “[t]he law in its majestic equality forbids
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets,
and to steal bread”178 and opposite the famous statement that “[i]t is a
settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”179 Often there are
rights that have no remedies, and formal equality is substantively
unequal.
This dividing line is actually far more important than one might
initially imagine. The law makes no explicit exception to the speed limit
for speeding to get one’s wife to the hospital. No formal rule says that
jaywalking is permissible on an empty traffic-less street. Technically,
police may stop anyone who violates even the most minimal traffic
distinguish law from interpretation”).
174. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (arguing that rights and remedies should be viewed as intimately linked).
175. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 134-35.
176. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
56, 152 (1997); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:
State Courts and the Strategic Space Between Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 959, 961-73 (1985).
177. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2004).
178. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (1894), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 586 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002).
179. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
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law,180 and ask anyone at all if they will consent to a search no matter
what they are up to.181 Officially, students have sweeping rights to speak
freely in school,182 though everyone knows that in reality they do not.183
Law and legal propositions weave a complex and interdependent
fabric with other conventional and normative activities.184 They are not
cleanly segregable. As such, one way we might agree about what the law
is might be that we agree that the law creates and sustains certain social
facts, interactions, hierarchies, and structures. We might say that it
promises equal protection of the laws, but delivers something less—and
that this is something we massively agree about.
IV. LEGAL AGREEMENT AND POSITIVISM’S CLAIMS TO THEORETICAL
SUPERIORITY
As Part III sought to show, the claim that “there is massive and
pervasive agreement about the law throughout the system” opens for
discussion the remarkably rich variety of ways that we might understand
the nature of legal agreement and disagreement. But now that the
varieties of legal agreement have been laid bare, it is possible to return to
the fundamental reason for this Article, which is the remarkably
persistent claim that the existence of massive agreement makes
Positivism more plausible than competing accounts of the nature of law;
that differing theories of the concept of law must make “extravagant”
claims to achieve the coincidental outcome—massive agreement—that
Positivism comfortably predicts (and that Positivists regard as a
constitutive feature of mature legal systems).
In canvassing the possible meanings of agreement, however, we
have also seen the possible forms of disagreement. Those forms of
agreement and disagreement reveal that claims of Positivism’s superior
descriptive accuracy of the concept of law are overstated, that Positivism
struggles to account for forms of disagreement that most individuals
would consider distinctly “legal” even though they cannot be traced to
180. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
181. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973).
182. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
183. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 973-76
(1995) (schools teach citizenship and obedience to authority).
184. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1784 (“[A]lthough the language game of
constitutional argument is different from the language game of politics or that of morality, the three
language games (and indeed possibly others) are interpenetrating. They are not identical, but they
have linkages and allegiances that cannot be fully and finally distinguished and separated.”).
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conventionality or a “rule of recognition.”
A.

Massive Agreement and Positivism’s Supposed Descriptive
Superiority

The argument for Legal Positivism’s claims to descriptive
superiority over other accounts of the concept of law are that it better
explains why there is massive agreement.185 That is, a legal proposition’s
truth or falsity, in Legal Positivism, is defined as whether there is
agreement among legal officials about it.186 In Natural Law, a legal
proposition’s truth would be defined by its consistency with
transcendental reason, and in Dworkinism by the degree to which one or
another outcome of the proposition would best fit and justify the legal
system as a whole, casting it in its best light.187 These latter two theories
of law do not require legal agreement by anyone to establish the veracity
of legal claims—they appeal to other sources.188
But it is not readily apparent why Legal Positivism’s prediction that
there exists massive agreement among officials about the content of law
should have any relationship whatsoever with our expectations regarding
agreement about the law among the general public. Indeed, most people
admittedly do not know the uniquely legal grammar necessary to even
make sense of legal content agreement among officials and practicing
attorneys. Yet, individuals manage to stop at stop signs, avoid
committing trespass or murder, fill out draft forms, obtain driver’s
licenses, sign leases, and pay their taxes capably with minimal
knowledge of the specialized legal grammar that forms the unique
conventionality that decides concrete cases. Perhaps this is because
semantic content agreement is sufficient to fill the entire gap. However,
even in Legal Positivism, semantic content agreement is merely a tool of

185. See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1247-49; sources
cited supra note 7.
186. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 290 (“The idea that the criteria of legality are
determined by consensus is not just one aspect of legal practice among many; on current accounts of
legal positivism, it is the fundamental ground rule of law. What ultimately makes it the case that
some rule is a binding legal rule is that it is validated by some standard accepted by officials of the
group.”); sources cited supra note 18.
187. See DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 228-38; see also Silas Wasserstrom, The Empire’s New
Clothes, 75 GEO. L.J. 199, 274-75 (1986) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986))
(describing Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation).
188. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 166 (“Dworkin rejects conventionalism of all kinds
and at every turn.”); DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 138 (“[N]othing need be settled as a matter of
convention in order for a legal system not only to exist but flourish.”); Moore, supra note 138, at
291-96 & n.25.
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agreement, not a source of agreement. Legal Positivism makes use of
language conventions to advance and instantiate legal conventions, not
vice versa. As such, widespread semantic content agreement does
nothing to make Legal Positivism more plausible at all—whether law is
conventional or not conventional, we would still expect the tax forms to
be written in English rather than French. Reasoning from massive
agreement about words to massive agreement about the law is reasoning
backward.
The other possibility is that the law is more certain for officials in
Legal Positivism because it is conventional. Therefore, law is more
certain for everyone because it is more certain for officials. As such,
predictions—either about cases or about legal propositions—are
somehow likely to be more certain because law is conventional and not
some other way.
That implicates the greatest flaw in the reasoning of those who hold
out the notion of easy cases or massive agreement as reason to prefer
Legal Positivism. There is little reason to expect that Natural Law, Legal
Realism, or Dworkinism would give rise to any less certainty about the
law than law as a purely conventional social practice.
First, to the extent that Natural Law incorporates principles that are
considered by sincere adherents to be time-invariant human universals, it
would stand to reason that Natural Law would almost perfectly mirror
the actual morals, attitudes, and laws instantiated by society.189 Most
likely, Natural Law has little to say about how the tax forms should be
formatted. Yet, to the extent that it would flatly prohibit murder, torture,
and rape of its own moment, we find that man-made law reflects those
prohibitions. Viewed from the internal vantage point of an adherent to
Natural Law who believes that human beings have the capacity to detect
and understand the transcendental reasons that give rise to those natural
duties, one would fully expect that our laws would be closely aligned
with the dictates of that law.190
Second, to the extent that Legal Realism stands in for the idea that
legal materials and legal rules do not constrain legal officials, and that
they merely use them to justify their decisions post-hoc, we would
nonetheless still expect to see massive agreement. As an initial matter,
Legal Realism’s post-hoc justifications are designed by the very fact that
189. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 960 (1993).
190. See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 72, at 733-34; Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule
Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1531 (2009) (calling the
Golden Rule “[t]he only standard of duty common to all people.”).
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they are justifications, to lend the appearance of agreement. Agreement,
as Legal Realism itself argues, is a cloak to hide the exercise of
discretion.191
There is another reason to believe we would see massive agreement
even in a regime where there existed no legal conventionality. What
Judge Harold Leventhal once observed about the use of legislative
history—it’s akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends”192—tells us why Legal Realism’s theory of judges and judging
nonetheless predicts massive agreement. Judges and the politicians who
appoint them are friends. They share an ideology, often a culture, a
language, and a way of life. Legal Realism says that legal materials do
not constrain the decisions of legal officials, but that does not mean that
they are not constrained.193 We can know quite well how a judge will
decide an easy case, and how she will use the legal materials at her
disposal to engage in a post-hoc justification of her preordained
conclusion, even though those materials were not the reason she came to
the conclusion that she did. Even though “law” did not decide the case.
Third, Dworkinism presents the strongest case for massive
agreement since it explicitly contemplates the incorporation of existing
sources and legal materials into its unique brand of legal reasoning.194
Dworkinism treats the law like a chain novel in which each individual
judge is presented with the task of writing the next chapter, and whose
goal it is to write the chapter that best fits and justifies all the chapters
that have come before. It is unclear how or why this method—which
readily relies on existing legal materials, and incorporates existing
semantic and legal content agreement in reaching its conclusions—
would not appear almost identical to Legal Positivism in the mine run of
cases.195 In fact, it would only be in hard cases that one would expect the
two to be distinguishable.
Indeed, any theory of law that relies on conventional practices to
instantiate its norms while only predicting deviations when the existing
191. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3; HART, supra note 33, at 136; Green, supra note
33, at 1917-18; Newman, supra note 33, at 203.
192. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
193. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3; HART, supra note 33, at 136; Green, supra note
33, at 1917-18; Newman, supra note 33, at 203.
194. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 228-38.
195. Dworkin himself frequently and readily discussed the interrelationship between
conventions and his theory of law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 91 (explaining that we
encounter the conventions of law ready-made and whole cloth, but that it would be a “mistake . . . to
think that we identify these institutions through some shared and intellectually satisfying definition
of what a legal system necessarily is and what institutions necessarily make it up.”).
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legal superstructure has somehow failed is equally capable of accounting
for nearly all the kinds of massive agreement we observe.196 This is only
all the more so when we notice that no account of law that depends on
the notion that conventional legal materials matter much can make sense
of the profound ignorance of what laws there are.197 Thus, other theories
of law are just as capable of accounting for the existence of massive
agreement as Legal Positivism. In crucial ways, some of these accounts
do far better jobs of explaining the existence and nature of massive
agreement.
To put the point even more finely, Natural Law, Legal Realism, and
Dworkinism—just like Legal Positivism—predict massive agreement,
even if they do not require it. They are designed to explain and predict
the methods of determining, ultimately (or at least most likely, given the
possible meanings of the notion of legal agreement canvassed in this
Article), the validity of legal propositions. But none of these theories
denies—and all explicitly contemplate—that social practices and
conventions will be used to operationalize and build upon these
foundations in making law work. As such, whether Natural Law, Legal
Realism, Legal Positivism, or Dworkinism ultimately create in their own
image, we would nonetheless expect the projection of their effects—in
the form of agreement about what particular statutes say, or which
sources are the most authoritative legal sources—to be nigh
indistinguishable. As such, the argument from massive agreement should
not affect our decision to adopt any one of these theories over the others.
B.

Forms of Disagreement and Problems For Positivism

Even as Positivism does not seem to benefit from careful
examination of its claims to superiority from massive agreement, inquiry
into the nature of agreement poses vexing problems for Legal
Positivism, because extensional and intensional disagreements appear to
be normative in character—and possibly, if not frequently, moral and
political.
196. See Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 485 (2011)
(“[I]t is important to exclude from the category of obedience those actions that are consistent or in
conformity with the law but which are not taken because of the law.”). It is difficult to understand
the foregoing statement without presupposing a meaning of law, which makes the statement almost
unintelligible. See, e.g. COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 167 (“[E]ven a decision reached by applying
authoritative sources and those to which one is authoritatively directed, and doing so in an
appropriate or authorized way, need not state the law. That depends on what one’s theory of law
is.”).
197. That is, what is written in the rules, regulations, statute books, case reports, and the
Constitution, etc.
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The examples one could provide are myriad, but most often are
cleanly presented through questions involving persistent interpretive
disagreements. When a judge is asked to apply the statute: “No person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”
much about that statute’s meaning is determinable by its semantic and
legal content, but those sources of meaning do not exhaust the ways in
which we might be uncertain about how a legal proposition should be
decided. As the hypothetical cases presented earlier show, even easy
cases can be hard. What is a Court to do if the violation is manifest—
torture, beating, and whipping—but there is a procedural defect in
raising an objection to the admission of the evidence at trial? Can it
really be the case, as the Positivists suggest, that such an instance is
either decided readily by convention or decided by discretion, but cannot
be decided by argument over what the law requires? That it would not be
“legal” argument to engage in prescriptive disagreement about
paradigms, criteria, or theory?
This kind of disagreement is not purely the stuff of appellate courts.
Indeed, the actors in the legal system who most frequently engage in this
sort of reasoning about law are probably police officers and prosecutors.
But these sorts of difficult questions—which involve recourse to reason
and practical judgment—are still legal questions and the reasoning
process certainly appears to be a legal one. To the extent that Legal
Positivism seeks to exclude the inevitable disagreements that arise in
such situations—fraught and morally freighted as they are—it does so at
the cost of offering a descriptively adequate account of a frequent
occurrence that dictates the actual determination of a substantial number
of propositions of law—whether that disagreement is styled as a
language game or understood as effecting substantive outcomes in the
world.
Legal Positivists would accept that there might be explicit
normative disagreements about what the law requires in any of the
myriad easy cases presented earlier in this Article respecting our
hypothetical statute. As such, they would not necessarily disagree with
anything that has been said about the nature of agreement or
disagreement thus far. But to hold to Legal Positivism while accepting
the inevitability of normative interpretive disagreements is to miss an
important endogeneity. Legal Positivism says that social conventions
determine legality. Exclusive Legal Positivism argues that legal validity
depends solely on sources, not on merits. Inclusive Legal Positivism
argues that legal validity can depend on the merits of a law, but only if
our shared legal grammar—the rule of recognition, or what this Article
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has styled “legal content agreement”—allows for such merits-based
considerations.
But when we argue over that shared legal grammar—when we
argue over the content of the rule of recognition, (for instance, whether
the six modalities of constitutional argument really are the only six
legitimate forms of constitutional argument), we create the possibility of
normative disagreement about the very conventionality that is supposed
to create and sustain law. This form of disagreement, known as
theoretical disagreement, remains a serious challenge to Legal
Positivism,198 and one that can only be answered by arguing that it does
not really exist. That is, that its face value cannot be preserved.199
Nevertheless, legal grammar does change, and judges do try to play legal
grammarian as a way of deciding concrete legal propositions—which
seems to demand that we take the argument from theoretical
disagreement at face value and build a theory around it. But if we are to
take this form of disagreement seriously, it will require us to reevaluate
Legal Positivism.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article sought to show that the concept of legal agreement is
itself quite malleable and open to competing interpretations. This
ambiguity often means that we have little idea what is meant when
someone argues that there is massive agreement about what the law is or
that there are many easy cases. Reducing the level of abstraction, we see
that all forms of agreement, except pre-interpretive forms of “content
agreement” are really forms of intensional and extensional agreement,
which involve recourse to normative argument about how a concept
should be understood. As such, even in easy cases, it will frequently be
the case that we will not ever completely agree on the meaning of
concepts and rules involved, even if we reach the same result in their
application in deciding a particular proposition (in which case agreement
is often incompletely theorized).
Furthermore, we would expect to see massive agreement in any
theory of law that relies on conventional practices to instantiate its
norms. Since conventional practices are precisely the tools one would
expect any rational society to employ in operationalizing its law, we
would expect to see this often. Whether speed limits are ultimately a
result of transcendental reason or a social rule, we would still expect
198.
199.
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massive agreement about the speed limits on the street signs and in the
statute books. Therefore, the existence of massive agreement, such as it
is, should play little role in deciding between competing theories of the
concept of law.
Finally, because normative disagreement is a pervasive feature of
interpretation in both language and law, Legal Positivism invites its own
challenge in making massive agreement claims. In particular, it must
contend with the fact that even in easy cases, substantive normative
interpretive challenges can always be marshaled in determining the
content of concepts, and the sources of those challenges are not limited
by any social rule. For example, in contests over the concept of a chair, a
judge is free to make recourse to moral, ethical, and other sources of
practical reason in deciding the content of the concept. To the extent that
a Positivist would seek to argue that judges are bound by convention to
limit the sources to which they might make recourse, that argument is
itself a normative one that can be contested on its own merits. This
possibility of infinite regress poses a vexing challenge to the notion that
law is a purely conventional practice,200 and therefore, to the idea that
there is or can be a strict separation between law and morality.201

200. See COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 157 (“By modus tollens, if officials can disagree about
what the criteria are, then the criteria are not a matter of conventional practice.”)
201. Id. at 171 (“The problem is that positivists have no theory of revision. Hart certainly does
not. He tells us only that to resolve the dispute and in effect therefore to revise the law, the judge
must exercise discretion.”).
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